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We study price linkages between assets held by ﬁnancial institutions that maintain ﬁxed
capital structures over time. Firms in the banking sector manage their leverage ratios to
conform to prespeciﬁed levels. Our analysis suggests that regulatory policies aimed at
stabilizing the system by imposing capital constraints on banks may have unintended
consequences: banks’ deleveraging activities may amplify asset return shocks and lead
to large ﬂuctuations in realized returns. The same mechanism can cause spillover
effects, where assets held by leverage targeting banks can experience hikes or drops
caused by shocks to otherwise unrelated assets held by the same banks. (JEL G10,
G12, G21, G38)
Introduction
In this paper we study price linkages arising when otherwise unrelated ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms, which happen to hold the same assets on their balance sheets,
maintain ﬁxed capital structures over time. When an entity enters ﬁnancial
distress, it may be forced to liquidate some of its assets, thereby transmitting
negative shocks to other entities holding the same assets. If sufﬁciently
many ﬁrms carry out the liquidation simultaneously, this will lead to a self-
reinforcing mechanism causing further price drops, which in turn may force
other ﬁrms to liquidate so as to maintain their target leverage.
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The spread of distress across entities can be quantiﬁed by systemic risk
measures, aimed at capturing tail comovements of ﬁrms’ balance sheets, as
well as the resulting negative spill-overs to the real economy. Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) introduce CoVar, which relates the systemic risk con-
tribution of an individual entity to the value of risk of the overall system,
conditioned on the institution being in a distressed state. Acharaya, Engle, and
Richardson (2012) propose the systemic expected shortfall index tomeasure the
expected amount of undercapitalization of a bank under the occurrence of a
systemic event making the overall ﬁnancial system undercapitalized. A related
systemic index, SRISK, is introduced byBrownless andEngle (2015) tomeasure
ex ante the expected capital shortfall experienced by a ﬁrm under a prolonged
period of market distress. Their index can be computed using the ﬁrm’s size,
leverage, and expected equity loss experienced when the market declines. An
axiomatic foundation,which includesmany statistical riskmeasures proposed in
the literature as special cases, is given in Chen, Iyengar, and Moallemi (2013).
Ample empirical evidence suggests that ﬁnancial institutions react to asset
price changes by actively managing their balance sheets (see Adrian and Shin
2008, 2010;Greenlaw et al. 2008; amongothers). Thismay lead to forced sales of
illiquid assets, which in turn depress prices and prompt ﬁnancial distress at other
banks that hold the same assets. Key contributions in this direction include
Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), who
consider the theoretical underpinnings of this approach. Chen, Iyengar, and
Moallemi (2014) analyze the role of common asset holdings in the propagation
of shocks, and illustrate how portfolio rebalancing may depress asset prices.
Motivated by recent empirical evidence provided by Adrian and Shin
(2010), showing that commercial banks actively track their leverage ratios,
we develop a dynamic model to capture price dynamics arising when a por-
tion of the market is constrained by such leverage targeting requirements. In
this setting, leverage adjustments and ﬂuctuations in asset returns reinforce
each other via a feedback mechanism. A sudden drop in the market price of
an asset forces a leverage targeting bank to sell even more units in order to
meet its target leverage. If other potential buyers face similar constraints at the
same time, the result is an ampliﬁcation effect.
Some studies have also analyzed the speed at which banks adjust their
leverage ratio. Berger et al. (2008) ﬁnd strong evidence that poorly capitalized
banks adjust toward their targets more quickly than well-capitalized banks.
Gropp and Heider (2010) ﬁnd that the speed adjustment of banks towards
their target leverage is on the order of 45%.
None of the above papers consider price linkages arising from the leverage
targeting constraint. A notable exception is Greenwood, Landier, and
Thesmar (2014), who provide and calibrate a model of ﬁre-sale spillovers.
Their study takes as given the asset holdings of ﬁnancial institutions, liquidity
of assets, and the price impact generated by liquidation procedures due to
adverse shocks. Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014) provide formulas
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quantifying the aggregate vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system as well as the
contribution of each individual bank to vulnerability. Duarte and Eisenbach
(2013) decompose this vulnerability measure into three key factors: size, le-
verage and illiquidity concentration. They provide an empirical analysis iden-
tifying periods during which each of these factors has the highest impact on
ﬁre-sales externalities.
Our study is related to Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014) and
Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), but presents important differences, which we
outline next. Ourmarket is divided into two sectors, referred to as the banking
sector and nonbanking sector, respectively. Firms in the banking sector ac-
tively manage their leverage ratios to conformwith a prespeciﬁed target level.
The nonbanking sector consists of institutions that do not actively target a
ﬁxed leverage, such as mutual funds, money market funds, insurances, and
pension funds. These type of organizations are primarily equity funded and
do not exhibit cyclicality of leverage behavior. In contrast to Greenwood,
Landier, and Thesmar (2014) and Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), who focus
on ﬁrst-order effects of ﬁre-sales externalities, we also take into account
higher order effects caused by repeated rounds of deleveraging in response
to a negative shock. Such higher order effects become substantial in certain
regimes due to induced transmission and ampliﬁcation mechanisms. Our
main result shows that this happens when the size of leverage targeting
banks grows toomuch relative to the elasticity-weighted size of the nonbank-
ing sector. Under this regime, asset prices become highly sensitive to shocks
and the system enters a state of high vulnerability.
We also make other contributions to the existing literature. We relate the
price impact rule postulated by Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014) to
the reciprocal of the elasticity-weighted size of the nonbanking sector, mea-
sured as the dollar amount held in the asset. Doubling the size of the non-
banking sector or its price elasticity reduces the price impact of the initial
shocks by a factor of two. Second, in our model, asset holdings and prices
follow dynamics forced by the leverage targeting requirement and market
clearing conditions. In particular, we obtain that the demand curve of the
leverage ratio trackers is upward sloping, which is consistent with the analysis
of Adrian and Shin (2010) and Greenlaw et al. (2008).
The dynamic nature of our model allows quantifying spillover effects pro-
pagating to other asset classes due to multiple rounds of deleveraging. The
liquidating ﬁrms may choose to sell other assets than the one originally
experiencing a price decrease, thereby affecting ﬁrms with a similar balance
sheet compositions.
Before proceeding further, we introduce notations and deﬁnitions
used throughout the paper. For two vectors u ¼ ðu1    unÞ> and
v ¼ ðv1    vnÞ>, we let u  v ¼ ðu1v1    unnnÞ> denote the componentwise
product, also known as the Hadamard product. Similarly, u
v
¼
ðu1=v1    un=nnÞ> denotes the component-wise ratio. DiagðuÞ is the diagonal
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matrix with u on the diagonal. The vector of ones is denoted 1, where the
dimension is clear from the context.
1. Market Participants and Assets
The market is divided into two sectors: the banking sector and the nonbank-
ing sector. We think of the banking sector as consisting primarily of com-
mercial banks and investment banks. Their distinguishing feature in our
model is that they actively manage their leverage ratios to conform with a
prespeciﬁed target level. This behavior has been documented empirically by
Adrian and Shin (2010) using ﬂows of funds data. Adrian and Shin (2014) use
individual bank data to show that banks even exhibit procyclical leverage.
Our assumption of constant leverage is thus conservative in this case, and our
results understate the effect that would arise from procyclical leverage.
Procyclicality of leverage driven by value at risk also has been microfounded
in the study by Adrian and Shin (2014). Adrian and Boyarchenko (2013)
present a macroeconomic model where intermediate borrowing is restricted
by a value at risk constraint that gives rise to procyclical leverage.
The nonbanking sector consists of institutions that do not actively target a
ﬁxed leverage. This includes mutual funds, money market funds, insurances,
and pension funds that do not exhibit cyclicality in their leverage behavior.
1.1 The banking sector
There are N leverage targeting banks indexed by i. The state of each bank is
described by its balance sheet, which consists of assets, equity, and debt. In
our model, banks manage their capital structure exclusively by buying and
selling assets, and by increasing or reducing their level of debt. They do not
raise new equity capital in response to a positive or negative shock to the asset
value. This is in line with empirical evidence reported by Adrian, Colla, and
Shin (2012) showing that banks reduce debt during downturns, and do not
issue equity even when asset values increase. Figures 3 and 4 in their paper
show that equity of banks changes very little from one quarter to the next. In
other words, bank lending expands when its leverage increases, while delever-
aging is usually accompanied by a sharp contraction of lending.
There areK types of assets available, indexed by k, whosemarket prices are
denoted Pkt . We write
Pt ¼ ðP1t P2t    PKt Þ>
for the columnvector of asset prices. The aggregate supply of each asset is ﬁxed
and given byQtot ¼ ðQ1tot    QKtotÞ>. The quantity (number of units) of asset k
held by bank i is denotedQkit . For each bank, its vector of holdings iswritten as
Qit ¼ ðQ1it Q2it    QKit Þ>:
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The market value of the i:th bank’s holdings of asset k is Akit ¼ Pkt Qkit .
Similarly, as for the quantities, we write
Ait ¼ ðA1it A2it    AKit Þ>:
The total market value of the i:th bank’s assets is given by 1>Ait ¼
PK
k¼1A
ki
t .
To fund their operations, banks issue debt. We do not distinguish between
different sources of debt ﬁnancing (repo market, interbanking debt, and de-
posits) and use Dit to denote the total amount of debt issued by bank i at t.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that the interest rate r on the
debt is zero. This serves to simplify the theoretical analysiswithout having any
qualitative impact on the results. For completeness, we provide all key for-
mulas for the nonzero interest rate case in Appendix A.
The key assumption that drives our model is that each bank tracks a ﬁxed
leverage target, keeping the debt-to-equity ratio equal to a ﬁxed value li,
which may be different for different banks. That is, we assume
Dit
1>Ait Dit
¼ i; i ¼ 1; . . . ;N: ð1:1Þ
The conclusions of our analysis will remain largely unchanged if li were
allowed to vary somewhat over time; the critical assumption is that banks
actively make an effort to stabilize their leverage.
Through its operations, each bank i in the system generates a net operating
income Rit in the time interval ½t; t+t. This includes proﬁts and losses
derived from ﬁnancial transactions, as well as payment and collection of
interests on various transactions conducted as a normal part of its business
operations. The revenue stream can be stochastic and time-varying. We con-
sider a stylized description of commercial banking behavior. Banks use funds
raised through debt issuance and operational gains to purchase a variety of
assets. Those include securities such as Treasury, municipal and corporate
bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and loans, such as commercial and indus-
trial, real estate, consumer, and government loans.1 They also liquidate part
of their current holdings when they face losses and need to repay their debt.2
A fraction kit of this cash ﬂow is devoted tomanaging the holdings in asset
k. These fractions may be time and state dependent. Since there is no other
way the bank can use its cash ﬂow, we always have
PK
k¼1 
ki
t ¼ 1. We write
it ¼ ð1it    Kit Þ>;
1 Banks also earn income from off-balance sheet items, such as lines of credit, letters of credit, asset management
on behalf of wealthy individuals, and derivatives to hedge against credit or interest rates risk.Althoughwe donot
allow banks to invest in these assets, our conclusions would qualitatively stay the same if we were to incorporate
them into the model.
2 In the case of a nonzero interest rate, there are also cash ﬂows from servicing existing debt in each period. See
Appendix A for details.
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and refer to these numbers as the cash-ﬂow allocation weights. One particular
strategy that is studied byGreenwood, Landier, andThesmar (2014) is a ﬁxed
relative exposure policy. This means that the fraction of total value allocated
to each individual asset depends on its relative size. This is accomplished by
the cash-ﬂow allocation weights kit ¼ Akit =ð1>AitÞ.
Taken together, the above yields the fundamental cash-ﬂow equation:
Pkt+tQ
ki
t ¼ kit Rit+Dit
 
; i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K : ð1:2Þ
The left side gives the amount bank i invests in asset k at time t+t. The
right-hand side is the cash ﬂow resulting from (i) and (ii) described above,
multiplied by kit . Combining the leverage equation (1.1) and the cash-ﬂow
equation (1.2) gives the banks’ demand curves. The following result is a spe-
cial case of Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 1.1 The i:th bank’s incremental demand for asset k is given by
Qkit ¼
kit
Pkt+t
ðiQi>t Pt+ð1+iÞRitÞ: ð1:3Þ
The leverage ratio li and cash-ﬂow allocation weights kit are directly
related to the price elasticities of bank i. Indeed, in the absence of revenue
shocks, that is, Rit ¼ 0, and if the prices of all, except the k:th asset, are
unchanged, that is Pht ¼ 0 for h 6¼ k, then (1.3) becomes
Qkit
Qkit
¼ ikit
Pkt
Pkt+t
: ð1:4Þ
Note that the elasticity is positive, provided kit is. The reason may be under-
stood as follows: if from time t to time t+t the price of one unit of the k-th
asset rises, the ﬁrm will have to increase its debt level to track the leverage
ratio and invest the resulting amount by purchasing asset units. By a sym-
metric reasoning, if the price decreases, the ﬁrm will reduce its debt by selling
asset units. This reﬂects the upward-sloping form of the demand curve caused
by the leverage ratio-tracking behavior.
1.2 The nonbanking sector
The nonbank institutions also trade in the available assets. This gives rise to
additional demand, which we refer to as the nonbanking demand, modeled in
reduced form through exogenously speciﬁed demand curves.We assume that
these demand curves are decoupled across assets in the sense that the non-
banking demand for asset k only depends on the price of asset k, and not on
the prices of the other assets. Modeling the nonbanking demand in this way
allows us to focus on price ﬂuctuations caused by balance sheet linkages
among the leverage ratio-tracking banks.
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At time t, the nonbanking sector holds a quantityQk; nbt of asset k, and we
write Ak; nbt ¼ Pkt Qk; nbt for the corresponding asset value. The incremental
demand is given by
Qk; nbt ¼
gk
Pkt+t
Qk; nbt Z
k
t Pkt
  ð1:5Þ
for asset-speciﬁc demand shocks Zkt and positive constants k. We write
Qnbt ¼ ðQ1; nbt    QK; nbt Þ>;Zt ¼ ðZ1t    ZKt Þ>; g ¼ ðg1    gK Þ>:
The form (1.5) is justiﬁed by two features. First, if there were no leverage ratio
trackers present, market clearing would force Qk; nbt ¼ 0, leading to asset
price dynamicsPkt ¼ Zkt . This gives an alternative interpretation ofZkt
as the equilibrium price increment in the absence of leverage ratio trackers.
Second, the relationship between price and demand conditional onZkt ¼ 0
is given by
Qk; nbt
Qk; nbt
¼ gk
Pkt
Pkt+t
; ð1:6Þ
so that k can be interpreted as the elasticity of the nonbanking demand for
asset k, comparable to i
ki
t in (1.4). Note that since k is positive, the non-
banking demand curve is downward sloping, unlike the demand curve of the
leverage ratio-tracking banks. This is the behavior one expects from uncon-
strained agents. We let g ¼ ðg1; . . . ; gkÞ be the vector of price elasticities for
assets held by the nonbanking sector.
Although different speciﬁcations of nonbanking demands could be con-
sidered, they would not have a signiﬁcant impact on our results, as long as
they are downward sloping.
2. Asset Prices and Holdings
In this sectionwe derive the dynamics of asset prices and holdings enforced by
market clearing. A key quantity in this regard is the systemicness matrix,
introduced below. We also discuss the relation with linear price impact
models, which leads to an outline of how our model could be calibrated.
2.1 Market dynamics and the systemicness matrix
The dynamics of asset prices, as well as the holdings of the banks and of the
external market, are computed by imposing market clearing. The market-
clearing condition is
Qnbt +
XN
i¼1
Qit ¼ Qtot; ð2:1Þ
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where the vector Qtot of aggregate supplies is ﬁxed through time. A key
quantity in our analysis is the systemicness matrix St given by
St ¼
XN
i¼1
it
g  Anbt
iA
i>
t ;
or, in component-wise form,
Sk‘t ¼
XN
i¼1
kit
iA
‘i
t
gkA
k; nb
t
: ð2:2Þ
The systemicness matrix is a key determinant for excess correlation induced
by the leverage targeting banks. The analysis underlying this claim rests on the
following result, which gives the dynamics of asset prices and holdings. It is a
special case of Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 2.1 The cash-ﬂow equation (1.2), the leverage equation
(1.1), the external demand function (1.5), and the market-clearing con-
dition (2.1) imply that the dynamics of asset prices and asset holdings are
given by
Pt
Pt
¼ I  Stð Þ1 Zt
Pt
+
XN
i¼1
it
g  Anbt
ð1+iÞRit
" #
; ð2:3Þ
Ait ¼ Qit Pt+itðiQi>t Pt+ð1+iÞRitÞ;
Anbt ¼ Qnbt  ðg Zt  ðg 1Þ PtÞ;
assuming that the matrix inverse exists.3
Let us analyze the expression (2.3) for the vector of asset price returns.
The quantity in square brackets can be thought of as a vector of initial
aggregate return shocks. Through the inﬂuence of the systemicness matrix
St, these shocks are then ampliﬁed and propagated across asset classes,
potentially leading to signiﬁcant excess correlation in the realized
asset returns. To develop a more detailed understanding for this mech-
anism, suppose all eigenvalues of St have modulus strictly less than
one. Then the inverse ðI  StÞ1 can be expanded as a power series, re-
sulting in
Pt
Pt
¼ I+St+S2t+S3t+ . . .
 
Yt; ð2:4Þ
3 Recall our convention for componentwise division of vectors: Pt=Pt ¼ ðP1t =P1t ; . . . ;PKt =PKt Þ.
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where Yt is the vector of initial aggregate returns,
Yt ¼ Zt
Pt
+
XN
i¼1
it
g  Anbt
ð1+iÞRit:
Equation (2.4) clariﬁes how the initial return shockYt is translated into
realized returns. First, there is a direct impact, corresponding to the ﬁrst
term I in the power series expansion. Second, there is an indirect effect
arising from a ﬁrst round of deleveraging by the banks (in the case of
negative shocks), corresponding to the term St. The term S
2
t corresponds
to a second round of deleveraging, and so on. Each round has an impact
on the price, and the total realized return is the aggregate outcome of this
process.
The contribution to realized asset returns arising from the presence of
leverage targeting banks can be interpreted as a measure of ﬁre-sale extern-
alities, captured by the term St+S
2
t+S
3
t+ . . .. Indeed, for simplicity, we
assume zero revenue shocks, Rit ¼ 0, and have
ðReturn with banksÞt  ðReturn without banksÞt ¼ I  Stð Þ1 ZtPt 
Zt
Pt
¼ St+S2t+S3t+ . . .
 Zt
Pt
;
using the power series expansion in (2.4) for the second equality. Thus, the
difference in returns arises from the repeated price impact caused by the
leverage-targeting behavior of the banking sector. Omitting higher powers
of St would result in a similar notion of externalities as the aggregate vulner-
ability measure proposed by Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014) and
analyzed empirically by Duarte and Eisenbach (2013). However, as we dis-
cuss in detail in Section 3, the higher order terms become signiﬁcant in certain
regimes associated with excessive growth of the banking sector relative to the
nonbanking sector. In such regimes the linearized measure, where only the
ﬁrst term is retained,may substantially understate potential externalities from
ﬁre sales.
2.2 Relation with linear price impact models
A simple way to model price impact is by linear scaling: buying a dollar
amount xk of an asset k generates a return impact Zkxk, where Zk > 0 is
an asset-speciﬁc price impact ratio expressed as units of returns per dollar of
net purchase. This model has been used by Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad
(2011) (see also Coval and Stafford (2007); Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and
Ramadorai (2012)). In Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014), it is used
for studying price contagion caused by balance sheet linkages, and it is there-
fore of interest to compare this reduced-form model of price impact with the
expression (2.4), which links an initial return shock to actual realized returns.
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Most of the analysis in Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014) assumes
that banks, in addition to tracking ﬁxed leverage ratios, maintain constant
relative exposures. That is, the fraction Akit =ð1>AitÞ of the total asset value
held in asset k is kept at a constant levelMki. Combining this with the linear
price impact model described above, they derive the vector of return impacts,
HM>Diagð  Atott ÞM
 
Yt; ð2:5Þ
caused by one round of deleveraging in response to an initial shock Yt.
Here, H ¼ DiagðZ1; . . . ;ZkÞ is the diagonal matrix with the price impact
ratios on the diagonal, and Atott ¼ ð1>A1t ; . . . ; 1>Ant Þ is the vector containing
the total asset value of each bank. Comparing (2.5) with (2.4), we see that we
should have
St ¼ HM Diagð  Atott ÞM>: ð2:6Þ
Equation (2.6) establishes a direct relation between our systemicnessmatrix S
and the individual components deﬁning the aggregate vulnerability measure
in Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014) and Duarte and Eisenbach
(2013). Furthermore, the assumption of constant relative exposures means
we can impose kit ¼ Mki ¼ Akit =ð1>AitÞ. Component-wise comparison of the
left- and right-hand sides of (2.6) then gives the equality
Zk ¼
1
gkA
k; nb
t
: ð2:7Þ
The k:th price impact ratio k can thus be interpreted as one over the elasti-
city-weighted size of the external market, measured as the dollar amount held
in asset k. In particular, doubling the size of the external market reduces the
price impact of initial shocks by a factor two; doubling the elasticity of the
external market has the same effect.
2.3 Toward model calibration
We discuss procedures and data that can guide the calibration of our
model. First, we identify categories of assets held on the balance sheet
of banks that are potentially subject to ﬁre sales. These include sovereign
and corporate bonds, commercial real estate, and mortgages. One can
then estimate banks’ exposures to the different asset categories using data
compiled from regulatory authorities. For instance, quarterly released
data for U.S. commercial banks can be used to construct a time series
of banks’ exposures to different asset classes. The total asset value of each
bank is obtained by summing its exposures to the different asset classes.
From this, we compute the fraction of bank i’s exposure to asset class k,
and consequently estimate the allocation strategies ki. Such a method-
ology is also followed by Duarte and Eisenbach (2013), who group assets
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into thirteen categories so as to calibrate the matrix of portfolio weights
without having cross-asset price impacts of ﬁre-sales.
Next, we calibrate the debt-to-equity ratio. The debt estimate Di can be
obtained by subtracting the equity value of bank i from the asset valueAi.We
would then need to estimate the total size of the nonbanking sector on each
asset class. As for the banking sector, this can be done using data released by
regulators. For instance, the European Commission publishes assessment
reports giving balance sheet decompositions of the nonbanking sector
along with their evolution over time (see, for instance, Table 3 in European
Commission (2012)).
Finally, we need to estimate the elasticity parameter k. For this, we can use
the equation (2.7) and imply reasonable values for gkA
k; nb
t from studies
estimating the price impact ratios k. Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar
(2014) and Duarte and Eisenbach (2013) use an across-the-board value of
Zk ¼ 1013 for all assets. In view of Equation (2.7), this is likely too small for
many asset classes of interest. For example, Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad
(2011) ﬁnd a value of the order Zk ¼ 1:3 108 in 2001 for high-yield bonds
(see Table 8 in their paper), although there is variation over time.4 This trans-
lates into gkA
k; nb
t ¼ 7:8 107, which is very small in comparison to the
values used by Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014). Of course, one
would expect signiﬁcant variation across different asset classes.
3. Systemic Impact of Leverage Targeting Banks
In this section we discuss how the presence of leverage targeting banks affects
asset returns. This is captured by the systemicness matrix St, as is most con-
veniently seen from the expression (2.4). We ﬁrst establish bounds on the
spectral radius of St, which is the main determinant for the rate of conver-
gence of the power series in (2.4). Using these bounds we study how different
cash-ﬂow allocation strategies affect the sensitivity of asset returns to shocks.
The systemicness matrix may be interpreted as thematrix of edge weights in a
weighted network whose nodes are the available assets. This interpretation
provides a way of studying excess correlation induced by banks’ deleveraging
activity, as well as quantifying the contribution of individual banks to aggre-
gate systemic risk.
3.1 The spectral radius of the systemicness matrix
Themain determinant for the rate of convergence of the power series in (2.4),
and consequently for the size of the realized returnPt=Pt above and beyond
Yt, is the spectral radius ðStÞ, given as the maximum eigenvalue modulus
of St. The spectral radius can be thought of as an aggregate level of
4 For the years 2001–2005, Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2011) ﬁnd price impact ratios of
1:3 108; 1:1 108; 6:2 109; 6:4 109, and 9 1010 for high-yield bonds.
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vulnerability in the system, thus playing a similar role as the aggregate vul-
nerability index introduced by Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014).
However, in our case systemicness crucially depends on the relation between
the banking and nonbanking sectors.
Notice that the spectral radius is homogeneous in the sense that ðcStÞ ¼
cðStÞ for any constant c> 0.5 From the deﬁnition of the systemicness matrix
in (2.2), it then follows that scaling up the leverage ratios or the banks’ asset
sizes by some factor increases the spectral radius by that factor. In contrast,
scaling up the elasticity weighted size of the nonbanking sector by some factor
brings the spectral radius down by the same factor.
The following result gives some simple bounds on the spectral radius, and
these are useful in analyzing the effect of various model parameters on price
sensitivity.
Proposition 3.1 Assume all asset holdings and all cash-ﬂow allocation
weights kit are nonnegative, and let ðStÞ be the spectral radius of St. We
then have the bounds
max
k¼1;...;K
XN
i¼1
i
ki
t A
ki
t
gkA
k; nb
t
 ðStÞ  max
k¼1;...;K
XN
i¼1
i
ki
t 1
>Ait
gkA
k; nb
t
:
Consider ﬁrst the upper bound. Recalling the interpretation (1.4) of i
ki
t
as a demand elasticity, the upper bound is a measure of the size of the
leverage-targeting banks relative to the size of the nonbanking sector, as
measured by elasticity-weighted assets. When the nonbanking sector is
large, then ðStÞ is small, leading to a moderate impact on realized returns
by (2.4).
Consider now the lower bound. Again, this is a ratio between elasticity-
weighted assets; however, the numerator now only involves the banks’ hold-
ings of the k:th asset (for each ﬁxed k), as opposed to total asset holdings.
Symmetrically to the previous case, if the nonbanking sector is small in rela-
tive terms, then ðStÞ is large (close to one), causing a strong impact on
realized returns. An even more extreme situation occurs if there exists an
asset k such that
XN
i¼1
i
ki
t A
ki
t > gkA
k; nb
t ;
because then ðStÞ > 1 and the inﬁnite sum in (2.4) does not converge.
5 Indeed, detðcðStÞI  cStÞ ¼ cKdetððStÞI  StÞ ¼ 0, whence cðStÞ is an eigenvalue of cSt. This eigenvalue is
maximal, since otherwise, by the same token, St would have an eigenvalue larger than ðStÞ.
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The above analysis indicates that externalities are more severe when
assets are concentrated on balance sheets of large and highly levered
banks. This is consistent with the results in Duarte and Eisenbach
(2013), where size is identiﬁed as a key driver of the increase in aggregate
vulnerability before the ﬁnancial crisis. Our results also support the ﬁnd-
ings of Acharaya et al. (2010), who relate systemic risk to the size of
ﬁnancial institutions, and suggest a tax mechanism based on size to
make them internalize their externalities.
3.2 Cash-flow allocation strategies and sensitivity of returns
The bounds in Proposition 3.1 depend on the banks’ cash-ﬂow allocation
weights kit . It is therefore natural to ask how the allocation decisions
of individual banks inﬂuence the overall sensitivity of realized returns
to shocks. As in Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2014), we ﬁrst con-
sider the special case in which all banks use the ﬁxed relative exposure
strategy kit ¼ Akit =ð1>AitÞ. The upper bound on the spectral radius
becomes
ðStÞ  max
k¼1;...;K
XN
i¼1
iA
ki
t
gkA
k; nb
t
: ð3:1Þ
When it is tight, this bound indicates that the system is less stable if there
exists an asset class for which the holdings of highly levered banks are large
relative to the elasticity weighted size of the nonbanking sector. This can be
understood as follows. Under this allocation policy, if an asset class ex-
periences high growth, banks will distribute higher fractions of their ag-
gregate cash ﬂow to it. If holdings of the nonbanking sector in this asset
class are small, or asset demand elasticity low, the occurrence of a negative
shock may induce sales volumes that are too large to be absorbed by the
nonbanking sector. When this happens, the downward price pressure can
destabilize the overall system.
This result also can be interpreted in the context of illiquidity concentra-
tion, identiﬁed by Duarte and Eisenbach (2013) as a key driver of aggregate
vulnerability. Duarte and Eisenbach (2013) estimate it to be large when an
asset class is illiquid and concentrated on balance sheets of highly levered
banks. Our analysis indicates that illiquidity concentration exacerbates sys-
temicness, in that a large right-hand side in (3.1) is likely to be indicative of a
less stable system.
Next, we consider an allocation strategy consisting in selling (buying)
themost liquid assets when there is a need to delever (lever up). Our proxy
for the liquidity state of asset k is the elasticity-weighted size of the non-
banking sector, gkA
k; nb
t . Assuming that these quantities are either known
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or can be estimated by the banks, a liquidity-based strategy for cash-ﬂow
allocation is
kit ¼
gkA
k; nb
tXK
‘¼1
g‘A
‘; nb
t
: ð3:2Þ
It is shown in Section 2.2 that this can be interpreted as
kit ¼ Z1k ½Z11 +   +Z1K 1, where the Z‘’s are price impact ratios in a
linear model for price impact (see Equation (2.7)). An analogous liquid-
ation strategy is considered by Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar
(2014), and liquidity is obtained by varying the price impact ratio
across the different assets. Under the liquidity-based strategy, the spec-
tral radius becomes equal to its upper bound, namely,
ðStÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
i1
>Ait
XK
k¼1
gkA
k; nb
t
; ð3:3Þ
see Appendix A for a proof. Here, the spectral radius only depends on the
relative aggregate size of the banking and the nonbanking sectors. In
particular, the existence of an asset class for which price elasticity is
high and for which the nonbanking sector is large relative to the banking
sector, would be enough to stabilize the system. The result may be under-
stood as follows: if all banks adopt a liquidation procedure that focuses
on an asset with very elastic nonbanking demand, then even severe
deleveraging needs can be absorbed by the nonbanking sector. The re-
maining, potentially illiquid, assets will be unaffected since they are not
subjected to ﬁre sales.
Furthermore, the following proposition shows that the liquidity-based
strategy, if adopted by a majority of banks, would lead to a more stable
system. The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2 Assume all asset holdings are nonnegative. Then the right-
hand side of (3.3) is smaller than the right-hand side of (3.1).
The above result is in agreement with the simulation study of Greenwood,
Landier, and Thesmar (2014), who ﬁnd that the aggregate vulnerability of
banks under the liquidity-based strategy ismuch lower than under the relative
exposure strategy.
In reality, banks’ behavior is unlikely to be fully captured by either the ﬁxed
relative exposure strategy or the liquidity-based strategy. Rather, one would
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expect some intermediate strategy. Indeed, while focusing on the most liquid
assets makes sense, banks may be constrained from doing so in practice. For
example, if the most liquid asset is one that the bank does not currently hold,
it cannot be sold for deleveraging purposes unless short-selling is possible.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the bank may want to get rid of
“bad” assets if it anticipates further loss of value in the future, even if it means
accepting losses today. Nonetheless, to the extent that banks do use the most
liquid assets currently on their balance sheets, the above results indicate that
this is desirable also from a systemic point of view.
3.3 The network of asset prices
The systemicness matrix has a natural interpretation as the weighted adja-
cency matrix of a network with K nodes, corresponding to the available
assets. This network has a directed edge from node ‘ to node k with weight
Sk‘t . The interpretation is straightforward: a return shock to asset ‘ of size y‘
propagates along the edge ð‘; kÞ and results in a shock to asset k of size
yk ¼ Sk‘t y‘, due to banks adjusting their leverage. The shock yk forces further
leverage adjustments, causing return shocks to other assets, and so on. The
total realized return is the aggregate outcome of this process.
The expression (2.2) immediately lets us read off how the deleveraging
activities of bank i contribute to the overall one-step propagation of shocks
from asset ‘ to asset k. The contribution is given by
kit
iA
‘i
t
gkA
k; nb
t
:
Summing over k and ‘ gives the total one-step return impact caused by bank i,
i1
>Ait
XK
k¼1
kit
1
gkA
k; nb
t
:
This quantity is (1) proportional to the leverage ratio li, (2) proportional to
total assets 1>Ait, and (3) proportional to a weighted average of 1=ðgkAk; nbt Þ,
which proxies for asset liquidity (see Section 2.2). The weights are the
bank’s cash-ﬂow allocation weights. In other words, the strongest one-step
systemic impact is exerted by large banks that are highly levered and allocate
their cash ﬂows to illiquid assets (i.e., assetswith low and inelastic nonbanking
demand.)
However, one-step return impacts give an incomplete view of the systemic
properties of the banking sector as a whole, as well as the role of individual
banks. The aggregate impact on the return of asset k due to a shock in asset ‘
is given by the ðk; ‘Þ entry of the matrix
ðI  StÞ1 ¼ I+St+S2t+    ;
Price Contagion through Balance Sheet Linkages
241
provided ðStÞ < 1. To see why neglecting higher order effects beyond the
one-step impact may be misleading, consider the following example with
three assets (K¼ 3) and two banks (N¼ 2). Suppose both banks track the
same debt-over-equity leverage ratio l¼ 9 and have current assets and ﬁxed
relative exposure strategies given by
A1t ¼
1
9
0
2
664
3
775; 1t ¼
0:1
0:9
0
2
664
3
775;A2t ¼
0
1
4
2
664
3
775; 2t ¼
0
0:2
0:8
2
664
3
775: ð3:4Þ
Letting the nonbanking sector elasticities and holdings satisfy
g1A
1; nb
t ¼ 900; g2A2; nbt ¼ 400, and g2A2; nbt ¼ 300, the systemicness matrix
becomes
St ¼
0:001 0:009 0
0:02 0:187 0:018
0 0:24 0:96
2
664
3
775;
and its spectral radius is ðStÞ ¼ 0:97, that is very close to one. Now, even
thoughS3;1t ¼ 0, the (3, 1) entry of ðI  StÞ1 is 0.17. Thismeans that a shock
to asset 1 has a sizable impact on the return of asset 3, even though the one-
step effect is zero. In this example, there are two mechanisms that interact to
create this phenomenon. First, transmission occurs: the balance sheet of bank
1 is such that the initial shock to asset 1 propagates and generates a shock on
asset 2. Second, ampliﬁcation occurs: this induced shock is greatly ampliﬁed
through the deleveraging activities of bank 2, causing a shock on asset 3.
Here, the ampliﬁcation is caused by the strong emphasis of bank 2 on asset
3 in combination with the poor liquidity status of that asset. Indeed, suppose
bank 2 were to change its cash-ﬂow allocation strategy to
2t ¼
0
0:8
0:2
2
664
3
775;
shifting emphasis toward the (somewhat) more liquid asset 2. This would
have a dramatic impact on shock propagation: we now have ðStÞ ¼ 0:29,
and the (3, 1) entry of ðI  StÞ1 becomes 0.002.
This discussion serves to highlight twomainmessages. First, while the one-
step effect of balance sheet linkages on asset returns tend to dominate, second
and higher order effects may play an important role and should not be neg-
lected. Second, it reinforces the conclusion of Proposition 3.2 and the subse-
quent discussion by illustrating the ameliorating inﬂuence of liquidity-based
cash-ﬂow allocation strategies.
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4. Policy Implications
Section 4.1 develops a simulation study to analyze the relation between in-
stability and sector sizes, along with its dependence on banks’ allocation
strategies. We discuss policy suggestions aiming at promoting systemic sta-
bility in Section 4.2.
4.1 Asset growth and the extreme sensitivity regime
We evolve the dynamical system to illustrate the relationship between the
onset of instability and the growth of the banking sector relative to the non-
banking sector. Note that this is for illustrative purposes only and should not
be thought of as a calibration exercise. In particular, parameter values are
chosen in an ad hoc manner to exemplify typical qualitative behavior of the
model.
The revenue shocks Rit; i 2 f1; . . . ;Ng are chosen to be independent
zero-mean Gaussian random variables with standard deviation 0.1.
Similarly, the asset-speciﬁc demand shocks Zkt ; k 2 f1; . . . ;Kg, are inde-
pendent zero mean Gaussian, uncorrelated with Rt, and with standard
deviation 0.11. The initial aggregate size of the banking sector is 8% of the
aggregate size of the nonbanking sector. We set N ¼ K ¼ 2 and the initial
prices of both assets to P10 ¼ P20 ¼ 1. The leverage ratios are taken to be
1 ¼ 2 ¼ 10, and the demand elasticities are chosen to be g1 ¼ g2 ¼ 9.
Figure 1 reports a stable realization of the system under the ﬁxed relative
exposure strategy. The spectral radius of the systemicness matrix stays
bounded away from one, and correspondingly the total holdings of the bank-
ing sector in each asset class are much smaller than the holdings of the non-
banking sector. This is in line with the theoretical analysis of the lower and
upper bounds of the spectral radius done in Section 3.1. Moreover, since the
system is stable, we expect shocks to have a moderate impact on asset prices.
This is conﬁrmed by Figure 2.
Next, we display a different realization of revenue shocks and asset-speciﬁc
demand shocks, under which the same ﬁxed relative exposure strategy as
before leads to instability. This is shown in Figure 3. The banking sector
grows signiﬁcantly in asset 2 and even exceeds the nonbanking sector.
When this happens the spectral radius gets extremely close to one, and puts
the system in a regime of excessive correlation as detailed in Section 3.1. This
is reﬂected in the bottom panel of Figure 4, which demonstrates a high sen-
sitivity of the price of asset 2 to shocks when the system enters the high
sensitivity regime. In contrast, for the same realization of the shocks, if
banks adopt the liquidity-based allocation strategy (3.2) rather than the
ﬁxed relative exposure strategy. In this case the spectral radius stays well
below one, and the nonbanking sector remains sufﬁciently large compared
to the banking sector. Furthermore, the top panel of Figure 4 shows that the
return spike that appeared under the ﬁxed relative exposure strategy is no
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Stable realization
Top panel: Spectral radius of the systemicness matrix, including upper and lower bounds. Bottom panel: Total
asset values. The banks follow the ﬁxed relative exposure strategy.
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longer present. These results support the analysis in Section 3.2, where liquid-
ity-based strategies are shown to lead to more stable systems.
This numerical example illustrates that instability and excess correlationmay
occur for some realizations of the system, but not for others, even when the
underlying parameters are left unchanged. However, the likelihood of entering
the unstable regime depends on the allocation strategy adoptedby the banks. In
particular, the liquidity-based strategy reduces the probability that this occurs.
4.2 Informing policy making
Our model suggests that the spectral radius of the systemicness matrix is an
important determinant of price dynamics in the presence of leverage targeting
banks. A large (close to one) spectral radius may lead to high sensitivity of
prices to shocks, potentially triggering ﬁre sales. What can a regulator do to
mitigate these effects? The upper bound in (3.1) indicates that stability im-
proves if (1) the banking sector is small, (2) the nonbanking sector is large, (3)
nonbanking demand is highly elastic, (4) target leverage is low, or (5) banks
assign low allocation weights to illiquid assets.
Clearly a regulator has limited ability to inﬂuence (1)–(3), and in any case, it
is questionable whether preventive policies aimed at controlling the relative
growth of the banking versus nonbanking sectorwould be desirable. Onemay
argue that (4) could be achieved by imposing more stringent leverage ratio
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Relative price changes for the two assets under the same realization of shocks as in Figure 1
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Relative price changes for the two assets under the same realization of shocks as in Figure 3
Top panel: Liquidity-based allocation strategy. Bottom panel: Fixed relative exposure strategy.
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requirements. However, empirical evidence provided by Gropp and Heider
(2010) suggests that banks have stable capital structures at levels that are
speciﬁc to individual banks, and typically their target leverage is well below
the regulatory level.
More plausibly, regulators could create incentives for banks to operate
more closely to a liquidity-based strategy, in the spirit of (5). Policies of this
type are already in place: the newly imposed Basel III liquidity requirements
(see Basel III (2013)) feature such a mechanism. One of the key reforms is the
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). This requires banks to maintain an adequate
stock of high-quality liquid assets readily convertible into cash tomeet liquid-
ity needs over an acute stress scenario lasting 30 days. More speciﬁcally, it is
imposed that the ratio between the stock of high quality assets and the total
net cash outﬂows over the next 30 days be higher than one. To comply
with the LCR requirement, banks would need to restructure the asset side
of their balance sheets if their LCR is below one. This can be achieved, for
instance, by increasing holdings of high rated domestic government and cor-
porate bonds or residential mortgage-backed securities, while reducing expos-
ure to more illiquid assets, thus moving toward a liquidity-based asset
allocation strategy.
While our model does not provide conclusive guidance regarding the be-
havior of leverage targeting banks if LCR requirements are explicitly ac-
counted for, our results suggest that it is beneﬁcial for ﬁnancial stability if
banks hold liquid assets on their balance sheets. Extensions of the model
accounting for asset purchases and lending of last resort would also be inter-
esting. Such factors might contribute to reduce ﬁre-sales externalities, but
would also decrease banks’ incentives to invest in liquid assets and instead
push them to hold riskier andmore illiquid assets on their balance sheets. The
design of a comprehensive model in which this trade-off can be studied is
however outside the scope of the present paper.
5. Conclusions
Leverage has been identiﬁed by ﬁnancial regulators as one of the main causes
of the ﬁnancial crisis. Policy leaders have expressed concerns about the inad-
equate levels of capital in the ﬁnancial system and focused attention on the
leverage ratio. Meanwhile, empirical evidence suggests that banks tend to
track a ﬁxed leverage ratio. Our study addresses the effects on price contagion
resulting from the presence of leverage targeting banks. The key outcome of
our analysis is that the leverage targeting behavior can produce high ﬁre-sales
externalities and have a destabilizing effect, causing asset prices to become
highly correlated, and sensitive to shocks. This happens because banks that
track a ﬁxed leverage ratio have an upward-sloping demand curve. In normal
times, the downward-sloping demand curve of the nonbanking sector exerts a
stabilizing force on asset prices. However, after sustained periods of growth in
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the banking sector, this forcemay no longer be sufﬁcient to keep prices stable.
Our analysis contributes to informing the currently active policy debate on
leverage requirements. It provides support for policies aimed at creating in-
centives for banks to implement asset allocation strategies with higher expos-
ure to liquid, rather than illiquid, assets.
Appendix A. Nonzero Interest Rate
This Appendix contains all of our mathematical results for the case in which the interest rate r is
not necessarily zero. The propositions stated in the main text then follow as special cases. In the
setting of a nonzero interest rate, the cash-ﬂow equation (1.2) is replaced by the following, where
the additional term accounts for interest payments on existing debt.
Pkt+tQ
ki
t ¼ kit Rit+Dit  rtDit
 
; i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K ð5:1Þ
The following result gives the banks’ demand curves in this setting. Proposition 1.1 is recovered
by setting r¼ 0.
Proposition 5.1 The i:th bank’s incremental demand for asset k is given by
Qkit ¼
kit
Pkt+t
iQ
i>
t Pt  iAi>t 1rt+ð1+iÞRit
 
: ð5:2Þ
Proof Writing the cash-ﬂow equation (5.1) in vector form yields
DiagðPt+tÞQit ¼ it Rit+Dit  rt Dit
 
:
For notational simplicity, let Li ¼ i=ð1+iÞ, so that by the leverage equation (1.1) we have
Dit ¼ Li1>Ait. Substitute for Dit and Dit+t in the above equation to get
DiagðPt+tÞQit ¼ it Rit+Li1>Ait  Lirt 1>Ait
 
:
Rearranging using the identity 1>Ait ¼ P>t+tQit+Qi>t Pt leads to
DiagðPt+tÞ  LiitP>t+t
 
Qit ¼ it Rit+LiQi>t Pt  Lirt 1>Ait
 
: ð5:3Þ
The matrix multiplying Qit can be inverted using the Sherman-Morrison formula. First, since
1>it ¼ 1, we have
1 LiP>t+tDiagðPt+tÞ1it ¼ 1 Li1>it ¼ 1 Li 6¼ 0;
so invertibility is guaranteed. The inverse is given by
DiagðPt+tÞ1+iDiagðPt+tÞ1itP>t+tDiagðPt+tÞ1;
which simpliﬁes to DiagðPt+tÞ1ðI+iit1>Þ. From (5.3) we therefore obtain
DiagðPt+tÞQit ¼ ðI+iit1>Þit Rit+LiQi>t Pt  Lirt 1>Ait
 
¼ ð1+iÞit Rit+LiQi>t Pt  Lirt 1>Ait
 
;
where the second equality uses the identity ðI+iit1>Þit ¼ ð1+iÞit, which follows from
1>it ¼ 1. The stated expression (1.3) now follows by noting that ð1+iÞLi ¼ i. «
Next, we give the general version of Proposition 2.1, which is again obtained by setting r¼ 0
below.
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Proposition 5.2 The cash-ﬂow equation (5.1), the leverage equation (1.1), the external demand
function (1.5), and the market clearing condition (2.1) imply that the dynamics of asset prices and
asset holdings are given by
Pt
Pt
¼ I  Stð Þ1 Zt
Pt
+
XN
i¼1
it
g  Anbt
ð1+iÞRit  iAi>t 1rt
 ( )
; ð5:4Þ
Ait ¼ Qit Pt+itðiQi>t Pt  iAi>t 1rt+ð1+iÞRitÞ; ð5:5Þ
Anbt ¼ Qnbt  ðg Zt  ðg 1Þ PtÞ; ð5:6Þ
assuming that the matrix inverse exists.
Proof First, we use the market-clearing condition (2.1), and then the expressions (5.2) and (1.5)
for the demand functions to get
0 ¼ Pt+t Qk; nbt +
XN
i¼1
Pt+t Qit
¼ Diagðg Qnbt Þ Zt Ptð Þ+
XN
i¼1
it iQ
i>
t Pt  iAi>t 1rt+ð1+iÞRit
 
:
Multiplying from the left by Diagðg Qnbt Þ1 and rearranging yields
I 
XN
i¼1
it
g Qnbt
iQ
i>
t
" #
Pt ¼ Zt+
XN
i¼1
it
g Qnbt
½ð1+iÞRit  iAi>t 1rt: ð5:7Þ
Noting that the left side is equal to
DiagðPtÞ I  Stð ÞPt
Pt
;
we simply multiply the equality (5.7) from the left by ðI  StÞ1DiagðPtÞ1 to arrive at the stated
price dynamics (5.4). Next, we have Ait ¼ Qit Pt+Pt+t Qit. Inserting (5.2) into this
expression yields (5.5). The expression (5.6) is obtained similarly, using (1.5) instead of (5.2).«
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Under the stated assumptions, St is component-wise nonnegative. The
lower bound is exactly the inequality maxkS
kk
t  ðStÞ, which always holds for nonnegative
matrices (Horn and Johnson, 1985, Corollary 8.1.20). The upper bound, call it , satisﬁes
St1  \beta1, which implies ðStÞ  \beta by (Horn and Johnson, 1985, Corollary 8.1.29). «
Proof of Equation (3.3) Combining the expression (2.2) for the elements of the systemicness
matrix with the deﬁnition (3.2) of the liquidity-based allocation weights gives
Sk‘t ¼
XN
i¼1
iA
‘i
t
XK
j¼1
gjA
j; nb
t
:
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Hence, the kth component of the vector St1 is
ðSt1Þk ¼
XK
‘¼1
Sk‘t ¼
XN
i¼1
i1
>Ait
XK
j¼1
gjA
j; nb
t
:
Denote the right-hand side by . We have shown St1 ¼ 1, so that  is an eigenvalue with
eigenvector 1. On the other hand, by combining the upper bound in Proposition 3.1 with the
expression (3.2) for the liquidity-based allocation weights, we ﬁnd
ðStÞ  :
Since ðStÞ is the maximum eigenvalue modulus by deﬁnition, it follows that ðStÞ ¼ . «
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Suppose by contradiction that the claim is false. Then, for all k, we have
XN
i¼1
i1
>Ait
XK
‘¼1
g‘A
‘;nb
t
>
XN
i¼1
iA
ki
t
gkA
k; nb
t
or, equivalently, gkA
k; nb
t ð
PN
i¼1 i1
>AitÞ > ð
PK
‘¼1 g‘A
‘; nb
t Þð
PN
i¼1 iA
ki
t Þ for all k. Summing both
sides over k yields
ð
XN
k¼1
gkA
k; nb
t Þð
XN
i¼1
i1
>AitÞ > ð
XK
‘¼1
g‘A
‘; nb
t Þð
XN
i¼1
i1
>AitÞ;
which is a contradiction since the left- and right-hand sides coincide. This proves the result.«
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